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"The problems of public order in an emergency pose agonising choices and
stir deep passions. The subject is topical and urgent in Northern Ireland
today but it has amuch wider significance, for it raises basic questions about
any society's response to dissent and to violence."1
This survey will concentrate on the various constitutional provlSlons for
proclamations of emergency in Malaysia and India, with a few references to
emergency situations in other parts of the Commonwealth.2 Generalisations
regarding the diverse jurisdictions to be found within the Commonwealth are
always suspect, and rightly so. However, the Constitutions of Malaysia and India
display a sufficient number of common characteristics that render a comparison
between them worthwhile.
The written constitutions of the New Commonwealth states3 display, on paper,
a considerable distrust of the Executive. This is not surprising in the context of
colonial history, but it also acknowledges the tensions, ethnic, racial and political,
present in these states. Accordingly, provision was made for drastic powers to be
invoked should these tensions boil over. At the same time there was an attempt to
limit abuse of power through awritten constitution and provisions for a bi-cameral
• Of the School of Law, University of Buckingham.
1. Twining, Emergency Powers: A Fresh Start, quoted in Lee, Emergency Powers (Sydney, 1984), p.l.
2. India obtained its independence in 1947. Its Constitution may be described as autochthonous, i.e. it
was drafted and adopted by the Indian Legislature itself and, unlike the constitutions of most other
Commonwealth states, for instance, Malaysia and Zimbabwe, does not owe its validity to UK or
colonial legislation. The Indian Constitution, in particular its provisions on fundamental rights and
emergency powers, has served as a precedent in nearly all the Commonwealth states subsequently
obtaining independence. Malaysia became independent in 1957as the Federation of Malaya. In 1963it
was joined by Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore to form the new Federation of Malaysia. In 1965
Singapore left the Federation. The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore runs on parallel lines to
the Malaysian Constitution and the provisions relating to emergency powers are similar.
3. The term 'New' Commonwealth, although strictly inaccurate - India, for instance, has been
independent for 42 years and Malaysia for 33 - is nonetheless useful to distinguish these states which
became independent after the Second World War, as opposed to the 'old' Statute of Westminster
Commonwealth.
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legislature along the Westminster model, an independent judiciary enjoying
security of tenure, an impartial civil service, a bill of rights patterned variously on
that in the Indian Constitution or on the European Convention of Human Rights
and, fundamentally, political pluralism to safeguard against domination by any
single ethnic, racial or political group. In addition, a number of states, including
India, Malaysia and Nigeria, sought a further safeguard in a federal system of
government. The serious student of comparative constitutional law will, no doubt,
be able to list a much more comprehensive list of similarities and, indeed,
differences, but this will, perhaps, be sufficient as a starting point for discussion.
One point which may usefully be made here is the influence exerted by the
emergency powers applied in the United Kingdom during the two World Wars.
The wartime legislation has done much to shape the modern approach to
emergencies in the Commonwealth, particularly in the sphere of legislative and
judicial review of their use. It is not uncommon in both India and Malaysia to find
the courts referring to the United Kingdom wartime legislation and the cases
decided thereunder for their persuasive value.
The provisions on emergency powers in the constitutions of the New
Commonwealth raise a number of common issues:
1. the circumstances which must exist in these jurisdictions before a
proclamation of emergency may be made;
2. the constitutional formalities of such a proclamation;
3. legislative review of emergency proclamations;
4. the possibility of judicial review;
5. the constitutional formalities for the continuation of the emergency;
6. the extent to which constitutional rights are suspended;
7. the question as to whether proclamations of emergency could ever be
consistent with the concept of constitutionalism and with the rule of law.
Perhaps all of the above may be summed up in the single question: Are there
adequate safeguards against the abuse of emergency powers by an Executive
determined to maintain control? Viewed in this context, the focus of attention
should shift from the question whether emergency powers ought to be tolerated
within a democracy to whether such emergency powers as exist at anyone time are
proportionate to the dangers threatening that democracy. 4
Definition of emergency
There are four main types of emergency: wartime, as opposed to peacetime; and
civil, as opposed to martial. In this context, a 'civil' emergency refers to a situation
where neither the legislature nor the courts have been suspended, while a 'martial'




emergency refers to the imposition of martial law, a situation where the armed
forces have replaced civil administration and the constitution itself has been
suspended. This has frequently been the case in Pakistan. In the Begum Nusrat
Bhutto case (1977), Chief Justice Anwarul Haq detailed six separate periods of
martial law in Pakistan since independence.5 It is submitted that the concept of
'martial law', which may lead to the suspension or even abrogation of the
constitution, should be kept juridically separate from the concept of 'emergency'.
Under the latter, while parts of the constitution may be temporarily suspended
(usually the Bill of Rights), the constitutional machinery itself continues in
operation. It is frequently the case, therefore, that the legislature and the courts
carry on functioning.
Emergency powers may be defined as those extraordinary powers permitted to
government to deal with threats to the nation that cannot adequately be met with
ordinary powers. In some Commonwealth states there are broad categorisations of
what may be labelled an 'emergency'. Article 150 of the Malaysian Constitution,
for instance, declares that an emergency occurs when the "security or economic
life of the Federation" is threatened. In the United Kingdom itself a State of
Emergency would exist if it appears to the Crown that there have occurred or are
about to occur, events of such a nature as to be calculated to deprive the
community or any substantial part of it, of the essentials oflife by interfering with
the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel or light, or with the means of
locomotion.6
Any further attempt, however, to define an 'emergency' and 'emergency
powers' must be futile. They are by nature elastic concepts.? This was recognised
by the Privy Council in Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia8 where
Lord MacDermott observed that the natural meaning of the word itself was
capable of covering a wide range of situations and occurrences, while in Bhagat
Singh v. The King Emperor the Privy Council held:
"A State of Emergency is something that does not permit of any exact
definition: it connotes a state of matters calling for drastic action."9
In Nigeria, in the case of Lakanniv. The Attorney-General (West), the Supreme
Court declared:
"We think it wrong to expect that constitutions must make provisions for all
5. See Wolf-Phillips, Constitutional Legitimacy: A Study of the Doctrine of Necessity· (London, 1979).
6. Emergency Powers Acts 1920and 1964.
7. For a United Nations' listing of the wide range of threats recognised in written constitutions which
permit emergency powers, reference may be made to UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Study of the Rights of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, UN
Doc/E/CN4/826 Rev 1 (1965), p.184.
8. [1970] A.C. 379, at p.390.
9. A.I.R. 1931P.C.!I!.
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emergencies. No constitution can anticipate all the different forms of
phenomena which may beset a nation."lo
Circumstances under which an emergency may be declared
If threats to the stability or well-being of the nation cannot be met adequately
and effectively with normal powers then resort to emergency powers may be
justifiable. In fact, non-use of such powers would be dangerous; there is some
truth in the argument that, however drastic the solution, non-democratic powers
may be used to preserve democracy itself. A typical instance is the threat of
external aggression, as happened during the border war between India and China
when India proclaimed a State of Emergency in 1962and during the Malaysian-
Indonesian 'confrontation' when Malaysia made a similar proclamation in 1964.
Emergency powers may also be invoked when the state is threatened by internal
insurrection and terrorism, as happened during the communist insurrection in
Malaya (Malaysia as it then was), where a State of Emergency was declared by the
High Commissioner in 1948,and the Canadian terrorist crisis of 1970where, at the
request of the Quebec Government, the Prime Minister invoked the War
Measures Act of 1914.
The need for emergency powers is recognised in Commonwealth constitutions,
to a greater or lesser degree. It is also recognised by the various international
conventions. For instance, article 15 of the European Convention on Human
Rights permits derogations "in times of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation". II The underlying rationale is therefore
necessity - salus populi, suprema lex esto (the safety ofthe people is the highest law).
It needs to be repeated, however, that the true test of the viability of any legal
system is its ability to respond to crises without permanently sacrificing the
element of constitutionalism under the rule of law. As such there should only be
resort to emergency powers where the executive can demonstrate in the legislature
and in the courts that these powers are both absolutely necessary and that existing
powers are inadequate. Whilst the use of emergency powers is recognised, the
recognition is qualified to the extent that there are limits which a state cannot
exceed. Though "the flame of individual right and justice must burn more palely
when it is ringed by the more dramatic light of bombed buildings" ,12 the resort to
emergency powers in a democratic society does not permit the extinguishing of the
flame.13 In particular, the temptation to use emergency powers to deal. with
ordinary crises should be resisted. Unfortunately, the temptation to use
emergency powers to validate unconstitutional action has proved irresistible in
,-
10.Sc.58/69 of April 24, 1970(unreported), per Ademola Cl, quoted in Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in
the Emergent States (London, 1973),p.203.
II. See also article 4 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 1966.
12. Conway v. Rimmer [1968] A.C. 910, at p.982 per Lord Pearce.
13. Lee, Emergency Powers (Sydney, 1984), p.4.
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many parts of the New Commonwealth.14
In the case of Asma Jilani v. Government of the Punjab the Chief Justice of
Pakistan cited the dissenting judgment of Lord Pearce in Madizimbamuto v.
Lardner-Burke,15 and held:
"I too am of the opinion that recourse has to be taken to the doctrine of
necessity where the ignoring of it would result in disastrous consequences to
the body politic and upset the social order itself but I respectfully beg to
disagree with the view that it is a doctrine for validating the illegal acts ... " 16
Constitutional provision
In Malaysia, the relevant provision is contained in Article 150 of the Federal
Constitution:
(1) If the [King] is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the
security, or the economic life, or public order in the Federation or any part
thereof is threatened, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency making
therein a declaration to that effect.
The Federation of Malaya - since 1963the Federation of Malaysia - achieved
independence in 1957 in the midst of an armed insurrection by communist
terrorists. The new Constitution was itself conceived against a backdrop of a state
of emergency which had in fact been declared in 1948when the terrorists of the
Malayan Communist Party began their campaign of destruction. The law relating
to emergency powers, therefore, pre-dates the independence constitution. At the
time the constitution was drafted the situation of emergency was very much a
pressing issue, and the powers conferred upon the High Commissioner under the
Emergency Regulation Ordinance 1948, were extremely broad. In fact, section
3(1) of the Ordinance was in the same terms as section 1(1)of the U.K. Emergency
Powers Act of 1920.
The insurrection was defeated and the Emergency subsequently lifted but given
the rather inauspicious start it perhaps comes asno surprise to discover that a State
of Emergency has been, more or less, in constant existence to meet the various
crises which have erupted at various times since independence.
14. See, e.g., the cases involving unconstitutional action in removing Chief Ministers in Malaysia and
Nigeria: Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia fl970] A.C. 379; Adegbenro v. Akintola
fl963] 3 W.L.R. 63. In both these cases emergency powers were invoked in order to prevent challenges
as to the constitutionality of the action taken. It is not only in the New Commonwealth that the lure of
emergency powers has proved to be too alluring. In ]971 the state of Queensland invoked an emergency
in order to ensure that a rugby match could proceed: see Dean v. A 1I0rney-General of Queensland fl971]
Qd.R.391.
]5. fl969] ] A.C. 645.
16. P.L.D. 1972 S.C.230, at p.242.
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The launching of an intensive 'confrontation' by Indonesia during the Sukarno
era resulted in a state of emergency being declared by the King on 3 September
1964. (The 1964Emergency, it must be noted, has never been expressly revoked.
One consequence of this, by a historical oddity, is that the Proclamation of
Emergency still prevails in the Republic of Singapore which was at the relevant
time a component part of the Federation of Malaysia.) On 14 September 1966, a
constitutional impasse in the state of Sarawak regarding the dismissal of the Chief
Minister resulted in article 150 being invoked by the Federal Government in
relation to that state .17 Racial riots led to a Declaration of Emergency on 15May
1969. Finally, in 1977, the Federal Government invoked emergency powers to
deal with a political crisis in the state of Kelantan. Only one of these emergencies
has ever been specifically revoked. In 1962, the Proclamation of Emergency
declared in 1948 was lifted. Consequently, during the 33 years since Malaysia
gained its independence, only 2 years have been spent in a non-emergency
situation.
In India, as in Malaysia (and for that matter, in Nigeria and Kenya) the
emergency provisions in the Constitution were predated by colonial legislation, in
this case the Government of India Act 1935which itself perpetuated earlier similar
legislation.
In India, the main emergency provision is contained in article 352 of the Union
Constitution:
(1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the
security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether
by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may, by
Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect, in respect of the whole of
India or of such part of the territory thereof as may be specified in the
Proclamation.
Article 352 is further supplemented by article 356 which provides for a
Proclamation of Emergency in the event of the breakdown of the constitutional
machinery of any state in the Union and the President being satisfied that "the
government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of
this Constitution". Article 360 further provides for a State of Emergency when
"the financial stability or credit of India" is threatened.
A comparison with the Malaysian Constitution reveals that there is no specific
provision in that Constitution for a breakdown in the constitutional machinery of
any state in the Federation. Nevertheless, such an eventuality would be covered by
the "security" and "public order" clauses. In any event, the lack of such specific
provision did not prevent the 1966 Proclamation of Emergency in the state of
Sarawak caused by the constitutional impasse there nor did it prevent the Federal
17. See Stephen Kalong Ningkan, supra.
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Government from invoking the 1977Proclamation to deal with the political crisis
in the state of Kelantan.
A further similarity between the constitutional provisions is that a Proclamation
may in fact be made in anticipation of a "grave emergency" and before the actual
occurrence of the event. The Malaysian article 150(2)and the Indian article 352(3)
are in substantially the same terms on this point. However, there is no equivalent
clause in either articles 356 or 360, leading to the conclusion that in India the
breakdown of constitutional machinery or economic crisis must have actually
occurred before the President may act, while in Malaysia this appears not to be the
case.
In India an emergency was proclaimed for the first time in 1962 when the
Chinese attacked its northern borders. The Proclamation declared that a grave
emergency existed whereby the security of India was threatened by external
aggression. The emergency continued until 1968 when it was lifted by another
Proclamation by the President. In 1971,the outbreak ofwar with Pakistan resulted
in a Proclamation of Emergency which was not revoked until 1977. In the
meantime, a further Proclamation was made in 1975 on the ground that the
security of India was threatened by "internal disturbance". This Proclamation
was effectively terminated in 1978.Thus, on a rough count, India has been under
emergency rule for 12 out of the 42 years of independence.
The constitutional formalities of Proclamations of Emergency
Article 150(1) of the Malaysian Constition vests the power of proclaiming an
emergency with the King. In Stephen Kalong Ningkan the question arose as to
whether the existence of the emergency was an issue which the King alone could
decide. The majority of the Federal Court decided that this concerned matters
which were within his sole discretion. IS Indeed, the Lord President refused to
allow even the calling of evidence to show the existence of mala fides in the act of
proclaiming an emergency, and thought it incumbent upon the court to assume
good faith on the part of the King. In stark contrast was the opinion of the minority
judge, Ong FJ, who refused to regard the "satisfaction" of the King that a "grave
emergency" existed as meaningless verbiage, holding:
"[The words] must be taken to mean exactly what they say, no more and no
less, for article 150 does not confer on the Cabinet an untrammelled
discretion to cause an emergency to be declared at their mere whim and
fancy. According to the view of my learned brethren, however, it would
seem that the Cabinet have carte blanche to do as they please - a strange role
for the judiciary who are commonly supposed to be bulwarks of individual
liberty and the Rule of Law and guardians of the Constitution." 19
18. [1968] 1M.L.J. 119.
19. Ibid., p.126.
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In this case the Proclamation of Emergency was issued in respect of the state of
Sarawak where a question had earlier arisen as to whether the Governor of the
State could dismiss the Chief Minister on the strength of a letter signed by 21 out
of 42 members ofthe Council Negeri (the State Legislative Assembly). Believing
that Ningkan had ceased to command the confidence of the majority of the
members, the Governor dismissed him, appointing a new Chief Minister in his
place. Ningkan petitioned the High Court which decided in his favour.2o Aweek
after the decision reinstating Ningkan as Chief Minister, the Federal Government
issued the Proclamation of Emergency under which the Emergency (Federal
Constitution and the Constitution of Sarawak) Act 1966was passed. Important
provisions in the Sarawak Constitution were amended by this law so as to equip
the Governor with wide powers, enabling him to dismiss the Chief Minister in his
absolute discretion. When a vote of no confidence was finally carried in the
Council Negeri, Ningkan was again dismissed.
It was argued, on Ningkan's behalf, that no "grave emergency" existed, since
there were no outward signs of disturbances, hostilities, or threats of either. 21 The
Proclamation was therefore made infraudem legiswith the intention of removing
him from the post of Chief Minister. The augmented powers of the Governor,
made possible by the 1966 emergency legislation, were thus ultra vires, leading
consequently to an invalidation of his decision to dismiss Ningkan. The Federal
Court, as noted above, refused to question whether the conditions specified by
article 150(1) were satisfied. On appeal to the Privy Council, it was held that
Ningkan's appeal was to be dismissed as he could not discharge the onus of
proving mala fides. This was a strange view to take. The real question waswhether
a State of Emergency as defined by the Constitution existed. Under a written
constitution the courts possess the power to question this finding offact, a power
which does not exist in the absence of a written constitution and in a jurisdiction
such as the United Kingdom.22
Adispute which has arisen out of the Ningkan cases is the question as to whether
the King, in exercising the power to issue a Proclamation, is exercising a
prerogative power. This is the contention, among others of Professor Hickling in
his article "The Prerogative in Malaysia". 23 It is submitted thatthis cannot be the
position. Article 40 is very clear:
(1) In the exercise of his functions ... the [King] shall act in accordance
with the advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the general
20. [l966J 2 M.L.J. 187.
21. A similar argument failed in the Nigerian case of Adegbenro v. Akintola, supra, n.14.
22. An interesting contrast is provided by the United States Supreme Court which has exercised its
powers of review to the fun: see, e.g., the celebrated case of Marbury v. Madison (1803) I Cranch 137.
For an example of a case in which the Supreme Court sought to control the exercise of the Presidential
executive power, see ex parle Endo 323 U.S.283 (1944).
23. (1975) 17Malaya L.R. 207.
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authority of the Cabinet, except as otherwise provided by this
Constitution ...
It is true that the article provides for exceptions but these operate only when
expressly provided. Article 150contains no such provision. Moreover, the various
judgments in the Ningkan case are sufficiently clear. In the High Court, Chief
Justice Pike declared:
" ... since under article 40 of the Constitution the [King] is required to act
upon the advice of the Cabinet in making a proclamation under article
150 ... it cannot, I think, be argued that the power conferred by article 150
is a prerogative power analogous to certain powers of the British
Sovereign."24
In the Federal Court the Lord President equated the exercise of the power by
the King with action by the Government:
"In an act of the nature of a proclamation of emergency, issued in
accordance with the constitution, in my opinion, it is incumbent upon the
court to assume that the Government is acting in the best interest of the State
and permit no evidence to be adduced otherwise."25
In the Privy Council, Lord MacDermott said:
"On the 14th September, 1966 ... the [King] accing, it may bepresumed, on
the advice of the Federal Cabinet as required by article 40(1) of the Federal
Constitution, proclaimed a state of emergency ... "26
In its original form article 150 provided that once the King had issued a
Proclamation of Emergency, there followed a duty to summon Parliament "as
soon as practicable" if Parliament was not sitting when the Proclamation was
issued. Until both Houses of Parliament sat, the King could promulgate
Ordinances having the force oflaw if satisfied that immediate action was required
(article 150(2)as unamended). A Proclamation and any Ordinance had to be laid
before both Houses and, if not sooner revoked, ceased to be in force after the
following periods: (a) in the caseof a Proclamation, at the expiration of two months
from the date of its issue; (b) in the case of an Ordinance, at the expiration of 15
days from the date when both Houses sat. However, where resolutions were
passed by each House of Parliament, before the expiration of these respective
periods, approving them, the Proclamation and any Ordinance could continue in
24. [1967] ] M.L.J. 46, at p.47.
25. []968] ] M.L.J. ] ]9, at p.]22 (emphasis added).
26. []968] 2 M.L.J. 238, at p.240 (emphasis added).
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force (clause 3). In addition, under clause 5, Parliament may, while an emergency
is in force, pass laws "with respect to any matter" if it appears to Parliament that
the law is required by reason of the emergency.
In 1960,however, the time limits of 2 months (for a Proclamation) and 15days
(for an Ordinance) were deleted.27 Further amendments were added in 1981.28
The King's power under the article was now to include the ability to issue different
Proclamations "on different grounds or in different circumstances" regardless of
any Proclamation having been already issued or still in operation. 29 The continued
existence of multiple Proclamations is now, therefore, sanctioned expressly by the
Constitution.30
In this connection, reference may be made to the 42nd Amendment 1976,to the
Indian Constitution. This added a new clause 4 to article 352 which permitted a
multiplicity of Proclamations to be in force at the same time. However, the 44th
Amendment has now deleted clause 4. It is clear enough that the Malaysian clause
2(a) followed the example of the Indian clause 4. However, it is perhaps too much
to hope that the Indian abandonment of that controversial provision will be
emulated in Malaysia.
Under the new article 150(2)(b) where a Proclamation is in force and both
Houses are not then sitting concurrently, the King may promulgate such
Ordinances as "circumstances appear to him to require" if satisfied "that certain
circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action."
For this purpose, under clause 9, the Houses of Parliament are to be regarded as
"sitting" only where "the members of each House are respectively assembled
together and carrying out the business of the House."
The 1981Constitution (Amendment) Act also removed the constitutional duty
of the King to summon Parliament as soon as may be practicable. This is
significant since Parliament has the power to pass resolutions under clause 3 to
annul both Proclamations and Ordinances made thereunder. It is worth noting
that after the Proclamation of 1969, Parliament only sat again in February 1971,
after a period of almost 20 months.
Where a Proclamation of Emergency ceases to be in force (by revocation or
annulment), an Ordinance made under clause (2)(b) and any other emergency law
shall cease to have effect 6 months after the date the emergency ceases to be in
force.
The constitutional formalities under the Indian Constitution are similar to those
under the Malaysian Constitution. While the President may proclaim an
emergency, he, like the Malaysian monarch, is a constitutional Head of State and
he exercises his powers on the advice of his ministers. Article 74 of the
Constitution lays down:
27. Constitution (Amendment) Act 1960, s.29.
28. Constitution (Amendment) Act 1981.
29. Article ISO (2A), added by s.15(b) of the 1981 Act.
30. See Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecuror fl979] I M.L.J. 50, discussed infra.
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There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head, to
aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions.
An interesting question has arisen as to whether the President (or the Malaysian
monarch) may issue a Proclamation on the advice only of the Prime Minister.
Article 352 (like article 150 of the Malaysian Constitution) did not exclude the
possibility of a Prime Minister advising the issue of a Proclamation of Emergency
without the authority of the Cabinet - as Mrs Gandhi actually did, professing that
a rule of business enabled her so to act. The 44th Amendment has removed this
defect. An Indian Prime Minister cannot now advise the President to make a
proclamation of emergency on the Prime Minister's sole authority, for the
amended article requires that a Proclamation shall not be made "unless the
decision of the Union Cabinet that such Proclamation may be issued has been
communicated to him in writing".3l This issue has had interesting parallels in
Malaysia. In the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1983,article 150was amended to
read as follows:
(1) If the Prime Minisceris satisfied that a grave emergency exists ... he shall
advise the [King] accordingly and the [King] shall then issue a
Proclamation . . .32
The Amendment Act precipitated a political crisis, both on this as well as other
grounds. Accordingly, in 1984 a further Constitution (Amendment) Act was
passed to restore article 150to the pre-1983 position. Nevertheless, it is still a live
issue in Malaysia (as it also probably is under the UK Emergency Powers Acts of
1920 and 1964) and is particularly significant as the Government is a coalition
government. As such the Prime Minister may have difficulty in persuading the
members of the Cabinet who are not of his own party that an emergency should be
proclaimed by the King.
Legislative review
In its original form article 352 of the Indian Constitution provided that a
Proclamation of Emergency:
(2) (b) shall be laid before each House of Parliament;
(c) shall cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before
the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolution of both
Houses of Parliament:
One result of the tinkering with the Constitution by Mrs Gandhi's regime
31. See Seervai, Constitutional Law of India 3rd ed. (New Delhi, 1981), p.435.
32. Emphasis added.
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during the 1975 emergency and the consequent damning report of the Shah
Commission into the abuse of power during the emergency was that there has been,
what may be termed, a 'libertarian backlash'. The safeguards contained in article
352 have been further strengthened, a process that is unique among emergent
nations, whether part of the Commonwealth or otherwise, where the dominant
trend has been towards the erosion of constitutional safeguards.
Under the new provisions of the 44th Amendment, first, the approval of the
Proclamation by each House is to be given within one month and not two months
as before. This stands in sharp contrast with article 150 of the Malaysian
Constitution which has been amended such that Parliament need not even be
summoned to sit. Secondly, under the new provisions, the approval of the
Proclamation by each House is not to be by a simple majority as before, but by a
majority of not less than half the membership of each House and a majority of
two-thirds of those present and voting. Thirdly, a provision has been added such
that a Proclamation of Emergency would lapse within 6months unless each House
has approved of its continuance by the aforesaid majorities and this provision
applies to the continuance of the Proclamation for successive periods of 6months.
Fourthly, although the approval of the continuance of a Proclamation of
Emergency requires the special majorities mentioned earlier, the newly added
clause 7 obliges the President to revoke the Proclamation if the House of the
People (the lower House) passes a resolution disapproving the Proclamation, or its
continuance, by a simple majority. Fifthly, the new Amendment further provides
that if one-tenth of the membership of the House gives notice in writing of their
desire to move that the Proclamation, or its continuance, be disapproved, then on
receipt of such notice, the Speaker, if the House is in session, or the President, if
the House is not in session, shall call a special sitting of the House within 14days
from the receipt of the notice, for the purpose of considering the resolution.
The justiciability of Proclamations of Emergency and emergency
legislation
It is the function of the judiciary to interpret the written constitution - a
proposition repeated by Lord Diplock when delivering the judgment of the Privy
Council in Chokolingo v. Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago as follows:
"Underthe constitution on the Westminster model ... which isbase~ on the
separation of powers ... it is an exercise of the judicial power of the state,
and consequently the function of the judiciary alone, to interpret the written
law when made ... "33
However, the roll-call of emergency cases in all parts of the emergent nations of
33. [1981] I W.L.R.I06,atp.IIO.
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the Commonwealth display a sad conformity of judicial passivity and a reluctance
to uphold the very constitution they have been sworn to protect. Neither has the
Privy Council, in the increasingly rare situations where it is still the final court of
appeal, supplied the tenacity lacking in Commonwealth jurisdictions. Few,
indeed, are the occasions when it has delivered judgments unfavourable to the
executive. It would not be an exaggeration to say that there has been an over-
zealous attention to formalistic legalism and none to constitutional values and the
doctrines of constitutionalism.
Perhaps this is not too surprising given the common law tradition inherited by
commonwealth judges and illustrated by cases such as Liversidge v. Anderson,34
Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs35 and Pick in v. British Railways Board.36 The fact
remains, however, that the Commonwealth judges are dealing with a written
constitution and the guiding principles must surely be different.
In India, the question as to whether a Proclamation of Emergency was
justiciable was decided even before independence in the case of Bhagat Singh v.
King-Emperor, where an Ordinance made by the Governor-General under section
72 of the Government of India Act 1919,was challenged on the ground that there
existed no emergency to justify the taking of the action by the Governor-General.
The Privy Council held:
"The petitioner asked the Board to find that a state ofemergency did not exist.
This raises directly the question who is to be the judge of whether a state of
emergency exists. A state of emergency is something that does not permit of
any exact definition. It connotes a state of matters calling for drastic action
which is to be judged as such by someone. It is more than obvious that that
someone must be the Governor-General and he alone."37
In a long line of cases, the Indian courts have held that the issue of a
Proclamation does not require any conditions precedent, apart from the
'satisfaction' of the President. In Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, as to the
continuation ofthe Proclamation of Emergency and the imposition or restrictions
on fundamental rights, the Supreme Court held:
"How long the Proclamation of Emergency should continue and what
restrictions should be imposed on the fundamental rights of citizens during
the pendency of emergency are matters ... left to the Executive. "38
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court accepted the possibility that justiciability may lie
34. [1942J A.C. 206.
35. [1980J I W.L.R. 142.
36. [1974J A.C. 765.
37. A.I.R. 1931 P.c. 111.
38. A.I.R. 1964 S.c. 381,403.
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if mala fides could be proved. The high water-mark of judicial passivism was
reached in ADM Jabalpur v. Shukla. 39 This was a case under article 359, dealing
with the power of the President to suspend fundamental rigl1ts, in this case habeas
corpus. The Supreme Court held that the courts had no jurisdiction to set aside an
order of detention on the plea that it was illegal or mala fide. The Supreme Court
sought to justify the departure from its ruling in Makhan Singh on the basis of the
difference in phraseology in the Presidential Orders of 1962 and 1975 involved in
those two cases respectively.
In any event, there was an attempt to put the matter beyond dispute, for the
time being at any rate by the 42nd Amendment which added a new clause to article
352:
5. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution -
(a) the satisfaction of the President mentioned in clause 1 and clause 3 shall
be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any court on any
ground;
(b) '" neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have
jurisdiction to entertain any question, on any ground, regarding the validity
of [the issue of a Proclamation or the continued validity of a Proclamation].
The possible effect of this provision and the judicial response to it was never put to
the test as it was swept away by the reforms of the 44th Amendment. This merely
means, of course, that the status quo has been maintained. The courts will still not
review a Proclamation unless it be on the very difficult ground of mala fides.
The position of justiciability is no better in Malaysia. In the Stephen Kalong
Ningkan case the Federal Court had decided by a majority of two to one that a
Proclamation of Emergency was not justiciable, even on the grounds that it was
issued malafide.40 Lord MacDermott in the Privy Council described the question
as one "of far-reaching importance which, on the present state of the authorities,
remained unsettled and debatable."41 In the event, the Privy Council proceeded
on the assumption that the issue was justiciable, and found against the appellant as
he did not discharge the onus of proving mala fides.
The issue was again raised in Public Prosecutor v. Ooi Kee Saik42 andJohnson Tan
Han Seng v. Public Prosecutor.43 Both cases concerned the validity of emergency
laws but the judgments alluded to the question of justiciability of Proclamations of
Emergency. In Ooi Kee Saik, Raja Azlan Shah J repeated the approach of the
Federal Court in the Ningkan case:
39. A.l.R. 1976 S.c. 1207.
40. [1968] 1M.L.J. 119.
41. Ibid., p.242.
42. [1971] 2 M.L.J. 108.
43. [1977]2 M.L.J. 67.
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"The fact that the [King] issued the Proclamation showed that he was so
satisfied that a grave emergency existed whereby the security of the whole
country was at stake ... Indeed the Proclamation is not justiciable (see
Bhagat Singh v. King-Emperor and King-Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma).
The same principles governing discretionary powers confided to subordinate
administrative bodies cannot be applied to the [King] and are inapplicable. "44
As in India, constitutional amendment has sought to remove conclusively any
possibility of judicial review. Unlike India, however, it appears that the new
provision will remain for the foreseeable future. This new provision was added by
the Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1981 which provides that the "satisfaction"
of the King when issuing a Proclamation "shall be final and conclusive and shall
not be challenged or called in question in any court on any ground." The same
applies regarding:
150(8)(b )(ii) the continued operation of such Proclamation
(iii) any ordinance promulgated ...
(iv) the continuation in force of any such Ordinance.
In Johnson Tan Han Sengthe question was not so much whether a Proclamation
of Emergency was invalid at the time of its issue but whether a valid Proclamation
could lose its validity by "effluxion of time" or "change of circumstances". The
challenged Proclamation was issued in May 1969, under which a number of
emergency Ordinances were promulgated. Acting under the Emergency
(Essential Powers) Ordinance No.1, 1969, the Executive published the Essential
(Security Cases) Regulations 1975 which effected major changes to criminal
procedure. It was argued that no State of Emergency existed in fact in 1975 - the
year the Regulations were made. Since a lapse of nearly 7 years had intervened and
the circumstances which warranted the Proclamation of 1969 had disappeared, the
Proclamation could not be regarded as still operative. It had lost its validity
through change of circumstances. Consequently, the Ordinance and Regulations,
being dependent on a Proclamation which had ceased to be in force, were similarly
of no effect. The conviction of the accused under the 1975 Regulations could not,
therefore, be sustained.
A unanimous Federal Court rejected this contention, with the same attitude of
judicial self-restraint exhibited in other parts of the Commonwealth. The Lord
President characterised the question as 'political', agreed that the law applicable in
Malaysia in this connection was the same as that in England and India and
approved the following statement by Krishna Iyer J in the Indian case of Bhutnath
v. State of West Bengal:
44. Supra n.42, at p.113.
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" ... we have to reject summarily [this] submission as falling outside the
orbit of judicial control and wandering into the para-political sector. It was
argued that there was no real emergency and yet the Proclamation remained
unretracted with consequential peril to fundamental rights. In our view, this
is a political, non-justiciable issue and the appeal should be to the polls and
not to the courts. The traditional view ... that political questions fall
outside the area of judicial review, is not a constitutional taboo but a
pragmatic response of the court to the reality of its inadequacy to decide such
issues and to the scheme of the constitution which has assigned to each
branch of government in the larger sense a certain jurisdiction ... The rule
is one of self-restraint and of subject matter, practical sense and respect for
other branches of government like the legislature and executive."45
Implicit in the Johnson Tan decision was a recognition that a Proclamation of
Emergency could not lose its force by a " 'mere'" judicial pronouncement on the
matter. The courts have held that article 150 is clear: a Proclamation remains in
force unless revoked (by the Executive) or annulled (by Parliamentary resolution).
Reference may also be made to Public Prosecutor v. Khong Teng Khen where the
court held that the ultimate right to decide if an emergency exists or has ceased to
exist remains with Parliament and that it was not the function of the courts to
decide on that issue.46
The Johnson Tan decision leads to the result that where a number of different
Proclamations have been issued and not revoked or annulled, all remain in force.
In Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor this view was partly retractedY At the time
this case was heard, four different Proclamations had been issued - those of 1964;
1966; 1969; and 1977. None of the above had been expressly revoked or annulled.
The Privy Council (composed of Lords Diplock, Simon, Salmon, Edmund-
Davies and Keith) noted that the power to issue, as well as to revoke, a
Proclamation vested in the King but expressed the view that the Constitution did
not require the revocation power to be "exercised by any formal instrument". The
Privy Council then formulated a new principle: it was possible for an earlier
Proclamation to be impliedly revoked by a subsequent one. Their Lordships held:
" ... a Proclamation of a new emergency declared to be threatening the
security of the Federation as a whole must by necessary implication be
intended to operate as a revocation of a previous Proclamation, if one is still
in force. "48
In the most liberal pronouncement yet to be found in any of its judgments in
45. A.I.R. 1974 S.c. 807.
46. [1976J 1M.L.J. 166.




emergency cases from the Commonwealth, the Privy Council went on to hold:
"Apart from annulment by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament it [the
Proclamation] can be brought to an end only by revocation by [the King]. If
he fails to act the court has no power itself to revoke the Proclamation in his
stead. This, however, does not leave the courts powerless to grant to the
citizen a remedy in cases in which it can be established that a failure to
exercise his power to revoke would be an abuse of his discretion
.... mandamus could, in their Lordship's view, be sought against members
of the Cabinet requiring them to advise [the King] to revoke the
Proclamation. "49
The effect of the decision was to invalidate the Emergency (Essential Powers)
Ordinance 1969, and all the regulations made thereunder. This, however, proved
to be only a temporary setback to Executive domination. Using its two-thirds
majority in Parliament, the Government succeeded in enacting the impugned
Ordinance as an Act of Parliament, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979.
Moreover, the Act was given retrospective effect and deemed to have come into
force in 1971, thus effectively negating the ruling of the Privy Council.
Protection of fundamental rights during an emergency
The question as to whether any of the fundamental rights contained in the
Malaysian Constitution receive protection during an emergency must be
answered in the negative. The provisions of article 150 are clear enough:
6.... no provision of any Ordinance promulgated under this article, and no
provision of any Act of Parliament which is passed while a Proclamation of
Emergency is in force and which declares that the law appears to Parliament
to be required by reason of the emergency, shall be invalid on the ground of
inconsistency with any provision of this Constitution.
Interestingly, while clause 6 is extremely broad it does contain a saving provision
which in effect operates as a limitation, albeit a minor one and without practical
significance, upon the Executive even during an emergency. This is that no
Ordinance or Act of Parliament shall:
6.(a) .... extend the powers of Parliament with respect to any matter of
Muslim law or the custom of the Malays, or with respect to any matter of
native law or custom in a Borneo State; nor shall clause 6 validate any
49. Ibid., p.55. See alsoAttorney-General of Sl. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla v.Reynolds [19801A.C.
637. Cf. the Australian case of Farey v. Burrett (1916) 21 C.L.R. 450. This involved the validity of
regulations made under the emergency provisions of the War Precautions Act 1914-1915. The court
refused to question the "judgment, wisdom and discretion" of the executive.
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provisions of this Constitution relating to any such matter or relating to
religion, citizenship or language.
Under the Indian Constitution, article 358 suspends the operation of article 19
(containing fundamental rights) during the operation of an emergency. The effect
of article 358 is that it suspends the restrictions on the power of the State to make
any law in contravention of the provisions of article 19. It isworth noting that there
is no equivalent provision to clause 6(a) of the Malaysian Constitution.
Emergency powers and the rule of law
The question must be asked as to whether the rule of law can co-exist with
emergency powers. At first glance, it might be deduced that their co-existence can
only be an unhappy one. The former is a principle ofwide application which has as
its overall purpose the subjection of governmental acts to defined legal criteria so
as to avoid arbitrary abuse of power, while the latter consists of rules and principles
with the avowed aim of supplying government with extremely broad powers.
However, if it is accepted that emergency powers are necessary and, after all, no
matter how stable a country professes to be, it can never be totally insulated from
aberrant conditions, then this need not be inconsistent with the rule oflaw or with
the principles of constitutionalism. This is so only provided that the emergency
powers are subject to well-defined constraints. Thus, the executive must only rely
sparingly on emergency powers to meet crisis situations; the legislature is expected
to exert a measure of positive control over the continuation of emergency laws;
while the judiciary, as the guardian of the constitution, is expected to check
excesses of emergency powers in cases properly brought before the courts. It is
submitted that Nwabueze is correct in his analysis when he writes that emergency
powers can be accommodated with constitutionalism if they are conceived as a
temporary aberration occurring once in a long while and provided they are not so
sweeping as to destroy or suspend the restraints of constitutional government
completely. 50
It submitted that developments in Malaysia since independence have thrown
this 'balance' askew, such that the original commitment to democratic values and
the rule of law shows signs of erosion which cannot be defended under present
circumstances. Sadly, this is true of most of the emergent nations of the
Commonwealth.51 Emergencies in the new states are much too frequent; they have
tended to become the normal order of things, thus replacing constitutional
government with emergency administration. This is despite the fact that the
essence of the concept of emergency is its provisional or temporary status. It
follows, therefore, that it should be terminated as soon as the circumstances which
brought it into existence are reasonably controlled or no longer exist.
50. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (London, 1973).
51. See, ibid., p.174.
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Reference may be made at this point to the recommendations of the
International Law Association as follows:
(a) The duration of a State of Emergency shall never exceed the period strictly
required to restore normal conditions.
(b) The duration of the period of emergency (save in the case of war or external
aggression) shall be for a fixed term established by the constitution.
(c) Every extension of the initial period of emergency shall be supported by a new
declaration made before the expiration of each term (i.e.,with the approval of the
legislature). A strict scrutiny of every extension of the period of emergency is
imperative; prior approval is essential since the reason of urgency which might
have justified the initial declaration by the executive may no longer be relevant.
(d) The legislature shall not be dissolved during the period of emergency but shall
continue to function effectively; if dissolution of a particular legislature is
warranted, it shall be replaced as soon as possible by a legislature duly elected in
accordance with the requirements of the constitution which shall ensure that it is
freely chosen and representative of the entire nation. 52
Lee53 quotes statistics to the effect that from 1946to 1960, States of Emergency
have been proclaimed on no less than 29 separate occasions in British dependent
territories alone. There is a tendency to abuse the concession of emergency powers
in the constitution not only by using them for purposes for which they were not
intended but also by using them to suspend constitutional government altogether.
Perhaps this is not altogether too surprising. Emergency powers must be seen as
one of the constitutional devices, and, some would argue, a necessary device, for
adjusting the political, economic and social imbalances to be found in the racially
and ethnically heterogenous societies of Britain's former colonies. This is
especially true of those states of the Commonwealth which inherited
geographically unrealistic borders and substantial minority groups. These are
factors which have posed almost insurmountable problems even in the 'old'
Commonwealth, Canada for instance, and in the United Kingdom itself.
Emergency powers may be permissible when the circumstances are such that
they are invoked by a Government which is politically and legally accountable.
Such a Government may be able to invoke emergency powers without unduly
sacrificing the ideals of constitutionalism. Unfortunately, in states where the
executive is all-powerful, the legislature ineffectual and the judiciary timid,
emergency powers can only, at best, be regarded as a negation of constitutionalism
and, at worst, as authorised tyranny.
52. The 1984Paris Minimum Standards of Rights Norms in a State of Emergency; for further details
see Chowdhury, Rule of Law in Scare of Emergency (London, 1989).
53. Emergency Powers (Sydney, 1984), p.6.
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